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WHAT THE CRIMINAL LAW IS BUILT
UPON
Howard Newcomb Morse*
Let us consider how certain doctrines of the Law of Crimes exist
in other branches of the common law, sometimes under different no-
menclature. The doctrine of merger applies to both Criminal Law and
Family Law-the absorption of the attempt into the completed crime
and the fiction of the unity of husband and wife. For example, the
United States local common law majority rule holds that the misde-
meanor no longer merges by operation of law into the felony or the
lesser felony into the greater, but rather that the American public
prosecutor enjoys an election in the matter. Only the attempt is con-
solidated by operation of law into the completed crime. Also, the
American local common law majority rule holds that the common law
fiction of the unity of husband and wife remains in only certain aspects
-the wife's taking of her husband's surname, the wife's domicile be-
coming that of her husband's (the basis for the Real Property rebut-
table presumption that possession by the husband is also possession by
the wife), the inability of the wife to institute an independent civil ac-
tion against her husband for support or for either household or non-
household services rendered her husband during marriage, the inability
of either spouse to testify against the other in a civil or criminal pro-
ceeding brought against one of the spouses by either a third person or
the State without the other spouse's consent thereto, and the husband's
taking title to his wife's earnings in the absence of an express or im-
plied waiver on his part to such right, such waiver based on the theory
of a voluntary gift.
Another example is that of motive, which Salmond referred to as
"ulterior intent,"1 and which plays an important part in Real Property
in the sense that a bad motive helps constitute actionable waste or an
illegal so-called "spite fence," although there is a Real Property rebut-
table presumption in favor of damages rather than forfeiture, such pre-
sumption in a suit for waste by a remainderman against a life tenant
is countered somewhat by bad motive on the part of the life tenant with
the result that the court may decree a forfeiture which, in the absence
of the bad motive of the life tenant, might not have been decreed.
*Member of the U. S. Supreme Court Bar. Writer for The Alabama Lawyer,
the Georgia Bar Journal, the Dickinson Law Review, the Kentucky Law Jour-
nal, the New Jersey Law Journal, The Lawyer and Law Notes, The South
Carolina Law Quarterly, the New York State Bar Association Bulletin, and
The Journal of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia.
1 Salmond, Jurisprudence 523 (1937).
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The doctrine of former jeopardy is simply the Criminal Law coun-
terpart of the civil doctrine of res judicata. Likewise, an ex poste facto
law is the Criminal Law counterpart of a "law impairing the obligation
of contracts."'2 The special defense of entrapment is analogous to the
special divorce defense of connivance. And conspiracy is similar to the
special divorce defense of collusion.
The doctrine of self-defense is but a part of the law of necessity,
which has application as well to Delict and Constitutional Law.3 In
this connection, the word "self" in the phrase "self-defense" has
evolved in latitude of meaning and has a meaning quite different in
extent from the word "self" in the Real Property phrase "self-help."
From the standpoint of life, limb, and liberty, originally under the com-
mon law man had the legal right to strike and to kill, if need be, in the
protection of only his own person. Later, however, this right was ex-
tended so as to include the protection by man of the persons of his
immediate family. This enlarged meaning of the word "self" in the
phrase "self-defense" is analogous to the meaning accorded the word
"personal" in the law of infancy pertaining to the infant's liability on
quantum meruit for necessaries purchased which he needed and which
were for his personal benefit. The extended meaning of the word "self"
in the phrase "self-defense" was further enlarged so as to encompass
the protection by man of the persons of any fellow human beings
threatened with great and immediate bodily harm unless so threatened
in execution of public justice. Or perhaps, regarding this second ex-
tension, the word "family" instead was rendered an enlarged meaning
in this connection so as to refer to all members of the human family
rather than to only one individual family. The present meaning of the
word "self" in the phrase "self-defense" thus bears a meaning consid-
erably different in degree from the word "self" in the distraint designa-
tion "self-help," which remedy may be exercised, for example, by only
a lessor or someone in privity to him.
The rule that all penal statutes should be strictly construed because
they are in derogation of the rights of life, liberty, and property of citi-
zens was compared with the Real Property rule to the effect that all
statutes delegating the exercise of the power of eminent domain should
be strictly construed because they are in derogation of the property
rights of freeholders.
The conclusive presumption of knowledge of the law on the part of
the defendant in a criminal action is comparable with the conclusive
presumption of knowledge on the part of a non-resident defendant to
2 U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 10, clause 1.




a divorce libel resulting from constructive notice in the form of the
publication of a divorce citation.
The Criminal Law doctrine of constructive presence whereby either
a principal in the second degree who was not de facto at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission is considered de jure as hav-
ing been so present or a felon standing on one side of a State line who
shoots and kills a person standing on the other side of the State line
in another State although not de facto at the time of the slaying in the
State in which the victim received the mortal wound nevertheless is
considered de jure as having been so present is analogous td the Family
Law doctrine of constructive desertion whereby the spouse who by
bad conduct causes the other spouse to remove from the marital domi-
cile is considered the deserter on the ground that such spouse although
remaining de facto in the marital domicile nevertheless removed there-
from de jure at the time the innocent spouse left de facto.
The special criminal defense of alibi is similar to the Family Law
defense of non-access available to a husband in proving non-paternity
in a criminal action brought against him for his non-support of a child
born of his wife.
Under the old common law the killing of a master by his servant
or a husband by his wife constituted petty treason.. Also, under the
old common law an aspect of the doctrine of merger known as the
fiction of the unity of husband and wife existed whereby a woman's
legal identity became absorbed by that of her husband's upon marriage,
with the result that her legal identity was extinquished permanently
unless there was a divorce or her husband predeceased her. To be
consistent with this artificial conception to the effect that the wife's legal
identity was submerged in that of her husband's it would have to be
said that the killing of the husband by his wife was an act of suicide
on the part of the husband since the act causing death would arise while
the matrimonial unity or element still existed, a duality or compound
not arising until death. But just as one lie entails several others in its
train so too does one legal fiction necessitate another. So it was said
that the act causing death gave rise to a partial matrimonial duality
for purposes of criminal jurisdiction only, the offense being considered
in the nature of treason rather than homicide since the wife owed
allegiance to her husband by virtue of having pledged herself in the
marriage contract to obey him. It will thus be seen that the second fic-
tion, that of partial duality, was based upon a time distinction.
Under the doctrine of imposed intention, if a defendant stands mute
before the bar of justice at arraignment, refusing to enter a plea of
guilty or not guilty, the law will create a fiction and enter a plea of not
guilty for him. The law is not construing the defendant's intention as
his silence might be interpreted as readily to mean guilt as innocence.
1951]
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Rather, the law is imposing its own intention to fill the existing lacuna
in order to be consistent with its own preexisting fiction of the rebut-
table presumption of innocence. The doctrine of imposed intention
applies to the law of contracts whereby in many instances silence pre-
sumes consent. Silence on the part of a debtor converts an open ac-
count into an account stated. In regard to a contract for luxuries made
during infancy, continued silence on the part of the infant even after
reaching his majority effects a ratification. In regard to a contract of
sale on trial or approval, silence on the part of the bailee past the time
specified in the contract, or, if no time be stipulated, past a reasonable
time, will transfer the bailee's status into that of a buyer. As regards
a contract of sale and or return, silence on the part of the conditional
buyer past the time designated in the contract, or if no time be pro-
vided, past a reasonable time, will operate to preclude the conditional
buyer from re-investing title in his seller. In regard to goods patently
defective, when there is delivery without an opportunity of inspection
on the part of the buyer continued silent retention will result in a wai-
ver of possible objection. Silence on the part of a defendant in a civil
action who has received proper service of process presumes his admis-
sion of the truth of the allegations contained in the plaintiff's petition
and will result in the entering of a default judgment against him. A
man's failure to execute a will leaves his estate chargeable to the law
of descent and distribution, presuming that had he made a will he
would have divided, his estate in approximately equal portions among
his wife and children.
Under the old common law both a convicted felon and an illegiti-
mate child suffered a corruption of blood whereby neither could have
heirs nor be heirs. The estate of either escheated upon his death to
the Crown. The injustices of this harsh doctrine became recognized
first in regard to the illigitimate child who, though his parents had
violated the law of God and man, was totally innocent. The doctrine
was first modified so as to allow the illegitimate child to inherit from
his natural mother and was later modified so as to allow the children of
his body to inherit from him. The application of the doctrine to the
convicted felon was altogether abolished for it came to be realized
that his wife and children, who were entirely innocent of his wrong-
doing, were nevertheless punished for it by being deprived of any
property of his which they in all likelihood would inherit were it not
for the application of the doctrine. Also, it was seen that frequently the
escheat to His Majesty resulted in the convicted felon's wife and
children becoming charity wards of the King. Ironically enough, cor-
ruption of blood no longer applies to the convicted felon whatsoever
but still pertains in a limited form to the illegitimate child generally.
In the Constitution of the United States the right to order a forfeiture
[Vol. 3
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of a defendant's estate upon his conviction of treason is recognized.4
The doctrine of forfeiture of estate as punishment for wrong applies
in the law of real property whereby a life tenant guilty of extreme
waste may, at the instance of the remainderman, be shorn of his life
estate by the decree of a chancellor or a wife divorced on the ground of
her adultery may be divested by a chancellor's decree of her dower
inchoate.
Self-defense and mistake of fact, if proved by the defendant by a
preponderance of evidence, constitute valid and complete criminal de-
fenses. In self-defense the act causing death and the provocation there-
for are proportionate. In self-defense the provocation operates with the
same effect as the delict concept of contributory negligence and the
divorce doctrine of recrimination. Although the provocation was exert-
ed by the decedent, the State as plaintiff should be considered as his
agent, the agency not having terminated upon the victim's death since it
is one coupled with an interest.
In mistake of fact the act causing death and the provocation are
disproportionate, but the defendant thought them proportionate at the
time of commission, and furthermore a reasonable man (the jury)
thinks he would have made the same error acting under the same or
similar circumstances at the time. In mistake of fact the provocation
also operates with the same result as the tortious principle of contribu-
tory negligence and the divorce doctrine of recrimination.
Bare or simple provocation, if proved by the defendant by a pre-
ponderance of evidence, constitutes a partial defense for the purpose
of mitigating or reducing the offense from murder to voluntary man-
slaughter. In bare or simple provocation, the act causing death and the
provocation are disproportionate. That the defendant may have thought
them proportionate is immaterial as a reasonable man (the jury) thinks
he would not have the same error acting under the same or similar
circumstances at the time. The provocation exercised by the decedent
is subtracted from the act committed by the defendant and the State as
the special agent of the decedent for the purpose of prosecution re-
covers judgment for the difference in the form of punishment imposed
upon the defendant. This is analogous to the delict concept of com-
parative negligence and to the divorce doctrine of comparative rec-
titude.
Perhaps the best way to understand the nature of a crime is to con-
sider a crime in its relation to a tort for the two bear certain similarities
as wel as differences. The imposition of a fine in a criminal case is
analogous to the assessing of punitive damages in a delict action. The
release of a co-defendant in a criminal proceeding does not operate as
4 U.S. Const., Art. III, sec. 3, clause 2.
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a release of the other defendant as is the case with joint tort-feasors.
One may consent to the infliction of a delict but not to a penal offense.
One may settle for the injury received as the result of a tort not
amounting also to a felony but not for the injury received as the result
of a crime. Intent plays a role in criminal law similar to the role
assigned to neglignce in tort law. The concept of malum prohibitum,
as distinguished from malum in se, although often thought of as a crim-
inal doctrine exclusively, nevertheless figures in tort law in the sense
that one joint tort-feasor against whom liability is enforced may in
some jurisdictions obtain contribution from his fellow joint tort-feasors
in the case of a tort merely malum prohibitum. Contributory respon-
sibility on the part of the injured in a criminal action, if disproportion-
ate to the degree of force exerted against him, will not discharge the de-
fendant from liability, as would be the case in a tort action, but will
only mitigate the charge or the punishment.
There is no time limitation on tortious proximity other than the
statutes of limitation, but in reference to criminal proximity there is
also the year and a day rule pertaining to homicide. In the case of
crimes, every crime must be mentioned by name in a statute in order
to have the force of law. There is usually a separate statute for each
crime. The statutes usually define the crimes; however, if this is not
done, the common law definitions obtain. On the other hand, one or
two general statutes to the effect that no person shall suffer a wrong
without being afforded a remedy by the law can instate all common law
torts even though no specific torts be referred to by name.
The injured person may condone a tort but not a crime. However,
the State may partially condone a penal offense in the sense that it
may elect to prosecute for a lesser degree of the offense. Unlike the
delict defense of condonation, the divorce defense of condonation is
conditional upon the future good behavior of the erring spouse, similar
to the criminal concept of probation. Both crimes and torts are breaches
of contracts, statutes or public contracts, with the communal accent on
the former and the individualistic emphasis on the latter. The element
of malice seems to be the factor which enables society to reach a pro-
portionate degree of guilt and punishment between torts and crimes.
Just as the presence of malice authorizes the awarding of punitive
damages in a tort action so too does the presence of malice justify in-
dictment for the type of homicide carrying the severest punishment
in criminal prosecution.
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